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this problem. In Japan, shopping district associations have been organized
in many shopping areas. Business improvement districts (BIDs) are simi-
lar organizations in North America and Europe. This paper discusses the
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We take the existence of shutdown shops into account: if there are many
shutdown shops in the central shopping area, fewer consumers will frequent
the open shops, because shutdown shops seem to downgrade the area’s am-
bience. The establishment of voluntary associations increases the profit of
shops in the central shopping area and the consumer surplus. The equilib-
rium when there is an association is, however, still inefficient, because it
does not take into account the increase in consumer surplus. We also ex-
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1 Introduction
The decline of traditional central shopping areas is a serious problem in many
cities around the world. Suburbanization, which was enabled by motorization,
set the stage for the development of suburban shopping malls, which consumers
can easily drive to and park at, and from which they can purchase everything they
need. Consequently, the central shopping areas in many cities have lost customers,
and many shops within them went out of business. The closure of shops has made
the areas less attractive for customers, which further accelerated the decline.
Governments have recognized the problem and have made serious efforts to re-
vitalize these areas by demolishing old buildings, improving streetscapes, adding
street lights, and other methods. However, these attempts have not always been
successful. Besides, many local governments are in financial straits, and thus
do not have enough resources to do the work necessary to revitalize these areas.
Voluntary associations formed by firms, landowners, or households are often sug-
gested as a solution to this problem.
In Japan, shopping district associations were organized in many shopping ar-
eas. Shops located along one street formed a shopping district association that
would provide services such as shopping arcades, new pavement, security, and
event coodination. In North America, landowners and businesses in the city cen-
ter formed business improvement districts (BIDs). BIDs resemble the Japanese
shopping district associations. They provide security and sanitation services and
improve the district’s environment. Furthermore countries in Europe and around
the world have recently introduced BIDs. In this study, we analyze the role of
these organizations in urban (re)development.
Helsley and Strange [5] call voluntary organizations that provide collective
goods “private governments.” They define these organizations as (1) voluntary,
(2) exclusive, and (3) self-financing organizations that (4) supplement services
provided by the public sector and (5) behave strategically. In their model, a pri-
vate government is a group of firms or households that are not satisfied with the
services provided by the public sector. They show that the public sector reduces
the provision of public good in response to the existences of a private govern-
ment. This is because public goods provided by a private government and those
provided by the public sector are substituted. The equilibrium with a private gov-
ernment is not necessarily Pareto superior to the equilibrium without it; however,
they conclude that the effects of private government on social welfare are therefore
ambiguous.
Billings [2] has presented a theoretical study of BIDs. He focuses on two
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factors that influence BIDs’ actions: government intervention in the formation
of BIDs and competition with the suburban mall. Government may control the
size of a BID when it is formed. Billings claims that government control actually
makes the level of public goods provided by a BID inefficient. He also analyzes
the competition between the suburban shopping mall and the traditional shopping
area, where a BID can be created. The mall and the shopping area play a two-
stage game. In the first stage, the shopping area decides whether to establish a
BID. The mall chooses whether to enter or not at the second stage. Billings thus
finds three kinds of equilibria: one with no BID and no mall, one with a BID and
no mall, and one with a BID and a mall. He explains the conditions necessary
for each equilibrium to emerge. Billings does not, however, investigate the effects
of BID formation on economic welfare or the evaluation of alternative forms of
government intervention.
This paper discusses the role of the shopping district association in the revi-
talization of central shopping areas. We show that the formation of a shopping
district association improves the welfare of shops in the area and of consumers,
compared with areas in which there are no associations, but the outcome is still
inefficient. Thus we examine alternative forms of policy intervention that may be
used to attain outcomes that are more efficient.
Our model is different from earlier works in two ways. First, we take into ac-
count the existence of shutdown shops in the central shopping area. When many
shops in an area are shut down, the area becomes less attractive to consumers be-
cause the variety of goods they can purchase is smaller. The existence of shutdown
shops also downgrade the ambience of the area. This is a negative externality to
the open shops in the area. Second, we conduct welfare analysis of shopping
district associations. We evaluate three alternative policies that may help these
associations, prevent the decline of the central shopping area, and improve social
welfare.
We present this model in Section 2, and compare the equilibrium when there is
an asociation (we call it the equilibrium with association hereafter) and the equi-
librium when there is no association (the equilibrium without association here-
after) in Section 3. We compare the equilibrium and the first-best allocation in
section 3.3. Section 4 examines three second-best policies: optimal tax from
shops, matching subsidy to the association, and transport-cost subsidy to con-
sumers. We evaluate these policies with a numerical example in Section 5. Our
conclusions are presented in Section 6.
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2 Model
Suppose one-dimensional geographic space. Consumers are located according to
a given density function, n(l) (n(l) > 0), where l represents the location, l ∈ [0, L].
The central shopping area (Area C hereafter) is located at l = 0. Shops in Area C
supply continuum of different goods indexed by θ. The range of θ is [θ, ¯θ]. The
price of goods is pc when consumers purchase a good in Area C.
Consumers purchase each type of good one unit at a time. The revenue of each
shop in Area C is pcN, where N is the number of consumers visiting Area C. N
is determined by the consumer’s shopping decisions, which are explained later.
We assume that the costs of operating shops are different across types of goods,
and are represented as a function of θ, c(θ). θ is ordered according to the level of
operating cost, such that a larger θ means a greater cost (c′(θ) > 0). Shops in Area
C may organize a shopping district association. The shopping district association
collects the membership fee f . Thus type θ shop’s profit is pi(θ) = pcN − c(θ) − f .
Since c(θ) is an increasing function of θ, the profit is a decreasing function of θ.
Let θ∗ be the break even level so that the type θ∗ shop’s profit is just zero:
pi(θ∗) = pcN − c(θ∗) − f = 0. (1)
(θ∗−θ) shops whose type is in [θ, θ∗] gain positive profit and continue their business
in Area C. (¯θ − θ∗) shops whose type is above θ∗ cannot get positive profit and are
therefore shut down.
Consumers purchase (¯θ − θ) types of goods one unit at a time and consume a
composite good (numeraire). They can purchase the goods of [θ, θ∗] either in Area
C or in other areas. Shopping areas other than Area C are collectively treated as
Area S . The goods of (θ∗, ¯θ] are not available in Area C, so consumers purchase
them in Area S .
The utility of a consumer living at l ∈ [0, L] is
U(x0, l) = x0 +
∫ θ∗
θ





x0 is the consumption of the numeraire. δ(θ, l) = 1 if consumers living at l pur-
chase good θ in area C. δ(θ, l) = 0 otherwise. uc(θ∗,G) is the benefit derived
from shopping in Area C. We assume that consumers enjoy the benefit every time
they buy one unit of good in Area C. θ∗ represents the attractiveness of Area C as
larger θ∗ implies that a greater variety of goods is available, while it also implies
that there are fewer shutdown shops. G represents the public goods provided by
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the shopping district association such as arcades, pavement, security, and event
coordination. A shopping area with more public goods is more attractive to con-
sumers. Thus, uc(θ∗,G) is an increasing function of θ∗ and G.
us is the benefit consumers obtain when they purchase a good in Area S . us is
assumed to be a constant.








[ps + ts]dθ ≤ y,
(3)
where tc(l) is the transport cost for a consumer at l to visit Area C, which is an
increasing function of l. ps is the price of goods at Area S . ts is the transport
cost for shopping in Area S , which is assumed to be a constant. Transport cost
is incurred every time consumers buy one unit of good. y is the income of each
consumer.
We abstract the behavior of Shopping Area S in response to activities in Area
C. Although suburban shopping malls also make efforts to attract more con-
sumers, we do not consider this fact in our model because the focus of this study
is on the role of shopping district associations.
Each consumer chooses δ(θ, l) to maximize the utility (2), subject to the budget










[us − ps − ts]dθ. (4)
Since consumers maximize U(l), δ(θ, l) is determined as follows:
δ(θ,G) = 1 ⇐⇒ uc(θ∗,G) − pc − tc(l) ≥ us − ps − ts,
δ(θ,G) = 0 ⇐⇒ uc(θ∗,G) − pc − tc(l) < us − ps − ts.
Consumers go shopping in Area C if and only if the net benefit of shopping in
Area C is larger than that of shopping in Area S .
Let us denote by l∗(∈ [0, L]), the market boundary at which consumers are
indifferent to shopping either in Area C and shopping in Area S:
uc(θ∗,G) − pc − tc(l∗) = us − ps − ts. (5)
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Consumers in [0, l∗] purchase goods of [θ, θ∗] in Area C and those of [θ∗, ¯θ] in
Area S , while consumers in [l∗, L] do not visit Area C and purchase all the goods
in Area S . The number of consumers visiting Area C is equal to the population in
[0, l∗], N(l∗) =
∫ l∗
0 n(l)dl. Using this, equation (1) can be rewritten as
pcN(l∗) − c(θ∗) − f = 0. (6)
(5) and (6) determine θ∗ and l∗ as functions of f and G. Let us denote them as
θ∗( f ,G) and l∗( f ,G).
The shopping district association is a kind of club in this model. In club the-
ory (see, for example, Berglas [1]), only club members can enjoy the benefits of
public goods provided by the club. In our model, nonmembers (consumers) en-
joy the benefit of public goods provided by the association, and members (shops)
indirectly receive the benefit through the increase of customers. This is the key
difference between club theory and our model.
3 Equilibrium and Optimum
3.1 Equilibrium Without the Shopping District Association
When shops in Area C do not form any association, membership fee f and the
supply of public goods G are zero. So θ∗(0, 0) and l∗(0, 0) are the values at the
equilibrium without association. They are obtained by solving the following set
of equations:
pcN(l∗) − c(θ∗) = 0,
uc(θ∗, 0) − pc − tc(l∗) = us − ps − ts.
Without the association, each shop may supply some public goods voluntarily.
However, since public goods such as arcades and events are indivisible and not
provided by any individual shop, we can assume that the formation of an associa-
tion is essential for the provision of public goods in the shopping area.
3.2 Equilibrium With the Shopping District Association
Now, suppose shops in Area C organize an association to provide public goods.
Assume that the shopping district association chooses f and G to maximize the
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sum of the shops’ profits in Area C. The association’s maximization problem is
max
f ,G
∫ θ∗( f ,G)
θ
pi(θ)dθ =
∫ θ∗( f ,G)
θ
(pcN(l∗( f ,G)) − c(θ) − f )dθ (7.a)
s.t. G = f (θ∗( f ,G) − θ). (7.b)
The constraint means that the amount of public goods provided by the association
equals the total membership fees that the association collects from open shops.
This is the budget constraint of the shopping district association.
(7.a) (7.b) is a constrained maximization problem with respect to f and G.
We can restate it as an unconstrained maximization problem with respect to f
by substituting the constraint (7.b) into the objective function (7.a). Accordingly,
θ∗( f ,G), l∗( f ,G), and G are rewritten as θ∗( f ), l∗( f ), and G( f ). (7.a) and (7.b) can
then be rewritten as
max
f
∫ θ∗( f )
θ
pi(θ)dθ =
∫ θ∗( f )
θ
(pcN(l∗( f )) − c(θ) − f )dθ. (8)
Before examining the first order condition of (8), we conduct comparative























The numerators can be either positive or negative. For a stable equilibrium, how-
ever, the denominator of these equations should be positive.1
The first-order condition of (8) is
pcn(l∗( f ∗))dl
∗
d f = 1, (11)
where f ∗ is the solution to the problem.2 From (11), dl∗/d f should be positive at
f = f ∗. In other words, the revenue of the shops should increase if the association
raises f from f ∗. When the association raises f marginally, the revenue of each
1The positiveness of the denominator follows from the well-known stability condition.
2We ignored the corner solution (θ∗( f ∗) = θ) in which no shops are open in Area C.
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shop increases by n(l∗( f ∗))dl∗/d f . Because there are (θ∗( f ∗) − θ) open shops in
Area C, the sum of the shops’ revenue increases by (θ∗( f ∗) − θ)n(l∗( f ∗))dl∗/d f ,
which is the marginal benefit of increasing f . At the same time, the sum of the
shops’ cost increases by (θ∗( f ∗) − θ) because one dollar more in fees is imposed
on each open shop. Equation (11) states that the marginal benefit of increasing f
should be equalized to the marginal cost.
We can also interpret the first-order condition in a different way. Using equa-
tion (10), the first order condition (11) can be rewritten as





When the association increases the public goods provision by one unit, l∗, the
market boundary of Area C, spreads by 1tc′(l∗)
∂uc
∂G units (see equation (5)). Then the
number of consumers visiting Area C increases by n(l∗) 1tc′(l∗) ∂u
c
∂G . Since n(l∗) 1tc′(l∗) ∂u
c
∂G
consumers visit (θ∗ − θ) shops and buy one unit of goods (whose price is pc) at
each shop, the increment of the total profits in Area C is pc(θ∗ − θ)n(l∗) 1tc′(l∗) ∂u
c
∂G
while the cost to provide one more unit of public goods is unity. The marginal
benefit of public goods is equal to their marginal cost when equation (12) holds.
PROPOSITION 1 When the shopping district maximizes its total profit, the num-
ber of open shops in Area C is also maximized.
(proof) From (9) and (12), dθ∗/d f = 0 at the equilibrium with association.
The number of open shops (θ∗( f ) − θ) is maximized at the equilibrium, where
second order conditions are supposed to be satisfied. Q.E.D.
Note that it is a maximization under the constraint that the provision of public
goods is afforded by membership fees. More shops can be open without this
constraint.
We can also compare the welfare of consumers and firms at the equilibrium
with and without a shopping district association.
PROPOSITION 2 No shop in Area C decreases its profit and no consumer de-
creases her welfare thorough the establishment of a shopping district association.
(proof) Proposition 1 tells us θ∗(0) < θ∗( f ∗). Thus, pcN(l∗(0)) < pcN(l∗( f ∗))−
f ∗ follows, because pcN(l∗(0)) = c(θ∗(0)) < c(θ∗( f ∗)) = pcN(l∗( f ∗))− f ∗. Without
an association, shops whose type is in [θ, θ∗(0)] are open. Their profits increase
from pcN(l∗(0))−c(θ) to pcN(l∗( f ∗))−c(θ)− f ∗ when an association is established.
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Shops in (θ∗(0), θ∗( f ∗)] shut down when there is no association and remain open
when there is. Their profits increase from zero to pcN(l∗( f ∗)) − c(θ) − f ∗. Shops
in (θ∗( f ∗), ¯θ] remain closed after the establishment of an association. No shop in
Area C experiences profit loss.








(us − ps − ts)dθ
to
y +
∫ θ∗( f ∗)
θ




(us − ps − ts)dθ.





(us − ps − ts)dθ
to the above level. The utility of consumers in (l∗( f ∗), L] does not change. No
consumer experiences welfare loss. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 shows that the formation of the association makes all the con-
sumers and all the shops in Area C better off (or, at least, not worse off). Note that
this is not a Pareto improvement because the profits of shops in Area S decrease.
3.3 First-Best Allocation
In this paper, the first-best optimum is defined as the allocation that maximizes
the social surplus, which is the sum of consumer surplus, shops’ profits, and the





(pcN(l∗) − c(θ) − f )dθ.








[y + (¯θ − θ)(us − ps − ts)n(l)dl,
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where the first term of the RHS is the surplus of consumers in [0, l∗] and the second
term is the surplus of consumers in [l∗, L]. Πs is the profits of shops in Area S :
Πs = (¯θ − θ∗)psN(L) + (θ∗ − θ)ps(N(L) − N(l∗)) − cs(¯θ − θ).
The first term of the RHS means the sum of revenue by supplying goods of [θ∗, ¯θ]
to all consumers. The second term means the sum of revenue by supplying goods
of [θ, θ∗] to the consumers in [l∗, L]. The last term is their operating cost. Shops in
Area S provide (¯θ − θ) types of goods. cs is the operating cost to provide one type
of good and is assumed to be a constant. A is the fiscal surplus of the shopping
district association, A = (θ∗ − θ) f −G.
At the first best, the social welfare is maximized with respect to θ∗, l∗, and G.













uc(θ∗,G) − tc(l∗) = us − ts, (14)
∂uc
∂G
(θ∗ − θ)N(l∗) = 1. (15)
The LHS of equation (13) represents the marginal (net) benefit of an increase in
θ∗. The first term of the LHS of (13) is the cost of one more open shop, i.e. the
operating cost of the marginal shop. The second term is the increment of consumer
surplus by a marginal increase in θ∗. The third term is the increment of consumers’
transport cost. This is an opportunity cost for consumers who shift the shopping
destination from Area S to Area C. Note that the increment of shops’ revenue and
the increment of consumers’ expenditure cancel each other out in (13).
Equation (14) indicates that the marginal benefit and cost of extending Area
C’s market are equalized. If Area C’s market is extended by one unit, n(l∗) more
consumers will shop in Area C. Their benefit is (uc(θ∗,G) − tc(l∗))n(l∗). On the
other hand, they stop shopping in Area S . Consumer’s benefit decreases by (us −
ts)n(l∗). The marginal (net) benefit is zero at the first best.
Equation (15) expresses the trade-off inherent in supplying public goods. The
LHS is the marginal increase in the benefit to consumers that comes from increas-
ing the provision of public goods. The RHS is the marginal cost of providing
public goods. This equation is equivalent to Samuelson’s condition for the opti-
mal provision of public goods.
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What are the differences between the first-best allocation and the equilibrium?
Let us investigate how to decentralize the first-best allocation through taxes and
subsidies. First, compare optimal condition (13) with equilibrium condition (6).















If the membership fee (− f ) is set as equal to the last term (in the square brackets)
of the LHS of (16), the first best θ∗ can be achieved. The integral in the bracket
is the marginal benefit to consumers of there being one more open shop in Area
C. The last term in the bracket is the decrease in revenue of the shops in Area S
that is caused by a shift of consumers to Area C in response to larger θ∗. At the
equilibrium, the shops in Area C decide if they will stay open without considering
the positive externality to consumers (and negative externality to shops in Area
S ). If the fee is set as above, these externalities are internalized. Since the integral
term in the bracket is positive and the last term is negative, the sign of the sum is
ambiguous. If the sum is positive, the membership fee becomes negative, which
implies a subsidy to the shops in Area C.
Second, compare optimal condition (14) and equilibrium condition (5). If
consumers receive a subsidy of (pc − ps) for every unit of goods purchased in
Area C, the first-best market boundary l∗ can be achieved.3
Last, compare equation (15) to equilibrium condition (12). The LHS of (12) is
the marginal increase of total profits in Area C by additional public goods supply,
as mentioned above. The LHS of the first-best condition (15) is the benefit to
consumers that comes from the additional public goods. The subsidy that achieves
the first-best public goods supply is equal to the difference between the marginal








In summary, a subsidy to (or a tax on) individual shops in Area C internalizes
the externality caused by θ∗, and a subsidy to (or a tax on) the shopping district
association eliminates the welfare loss from inefficient provision of public goods.
3Subsidy (or tax) to consumers is necessary only if the price of goods is different between Area
C and Area S .
4The sign of Q is ambiguous but is likely to be positive because it is natural that the direct
benefit received by consumers exceeds the indirect benefit received by shops.
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In reality, however, the first-best allocation is hardly achieved, because the in-
formation about, for example, how consumers benefit from the provision of public
goods and the number of open shops is not available. Moreover, the subsidy to
individual shops in Area C is not practical. We introduce the alternative, second-
best policies in the next section.
4 Effect of Government Intervention
We will examine three types of government intervention policies. The first type
is the optimal fee policy, whereby the government controls the membership fee
f and the public goods provision G. This policy will reduce the welfare loss
from inefficient provision of public goods to some extent because the government
chooses f and G to maximize social welfare. The second type is the matching
subsidy, whereby the government subsidizes a part of the association’s expendi-
ture. This policy also reduces the welfare loss from inefficient provision of public
goods. Under this policy, we can expect that the public good provision increases
if it is too small at the equilibrium.5 The third type of government intervention is
the transport-cost subsidy, whereby the government subsidizes a portion of trans-
portation costs of the consumers when they shop in Area C. This subsidy will let
more consumers visit Area C and thus increase the sales of shops there. The as-
sociation will then be able to keep more shops open than those at the equilibrium.
4.1 Optimal Membership Fee: Optimal Tax from Shops
First, we examine the case in which the government controls the membership fee
of the association. Note that θ∗, l∗, and G are determined as functions of f ac-
cording to equations (5), (6), and (7.b). Thus, social welfare is also represented as
a function of f . The government decides f to maximize social welfare, S W( f ).
In this case, the government, not the association, collects membership fees di-
rectly from shops and provides public goods. The membership fee is therefore
equivalent to a tax.
The government’s maximization problem is therefore
max
f
S W( f ) = Π( f ) + CS ( f ) + Πs( f ),
5It is possible that the public good provision is too large in the equilibrium.
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where
Π( f ) =
∫ θ∗( f )
θ
(pcN(l∗( f )) − c(θ) − f )dθ,
CS ( f ) =
∫ l∗( f )
0




[y + (¯θ − θ)(us − ps − ts)]n(l)dl,
Πs( f ) =(¯θ − θ∗( f ))psN(L) + (θ∗( f ) − θ)ps(N(L) − N(l∗( f ))) − cs(¯θ − θ)




























∗) − (θ∗ − θ)psn(l∗)dl
∗
d f = 0. (17)
The first term of the LHS is the variation of Area C’s profit, which is positive
if f < f ∗ and negative if f > f ∗.
The second line of (17) shows the variation of the benefit to consumers in
[0, l∗( f )]. The first term in the square brackets represents the net benefit of shifting
the shopping destination for θ∗, which is positive if f < f ∗ and negative if f > f ∗





. The second term in the square brackets is the effect
of f on the benefit to consumers of purchasing [θ, θ∗] goods in Area C through the















The two terms in the third line of (17) are the variation of Area S ’s profit. The
third term is negative if f < f ∗ and positive if f > f ∗. The last term is usually
negative.7
The LHS of (17) is dS W/d f . At the equilibrium value f = f ∗,
dS W
d f









d f < 0 is possible (i.e. the public goods may decrease) in large f .
7 dl∗
d f < 0 is possible (i.e. the number of consumers visiting Area C may decrease) in large f .
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The first term is the variation of CS , which is positive. The second term is a vari-
ation of Πs, which is negative. When the membership fee f is marginally raised
from f ∗, the consumer surplus increases because there are more public goods pro-
vided. On the other hand, the profit in Area S decreases because dl∗/d f > 0 at
f = f ∗ from (11). Under this policy, the number of open shops, θ∗, and the total
profits in Area C, Π, must decrease from the equilibrium values because θ∗( f ) and
Π( f ) are maximized at f ∗.
It is unclear whether the optimal fee is larger or smaller than the equilibrium
value f ∗ (see Figure 1). If we let f o be the optimal fee and f CS be the value
maximizing the consumer surplus CS ( f ),8 Π( f ) and CS ( f ) are maximized at f ∗
and f CS , respectively. The profits of shops in Area S , Πs( f ), are minimized at
a value in ( f ∗, f CS ).9 f o maximizes the sum of these three functions. Figure 1
shows three possible cases of f o value: (i) f o ≤ f ∗, (ii) f ∗ < f o < f CS , and (iii)
f CS ≤ f o. If the variation of Πs( f ) is small enough, (ii) f ∗ < f o < f CS should be
the result.
In case (i), the optimal fee policy decreases Π and CS , while Πs increases
from the equilibrium. In case (ii), Π decreases but CS increases. Whether Πs
increases or decreases is unclear. In case (iii), the optimal fee policy decreases Π
while it increases either CS or Πs (or both).
4.2 Matching Subsidy to the Association
Let us now consider another second-best policy: matching subsidy to the associa-
tion. In this scenario, the government bears a part of the association’s expenditure.
The policy promotes the provision of public goods by the shopping district asso-
ciation if it is too small in the equilibrium. In reality, national or local government
in Japan subsidizes 1/2 to 2/3 of the cost for some projects planned by the asso-
ciation, such as constructing an arcade along the street, preparing an area security
system, and transforming a shutdown shop into a shop that sells local products.
Let the rate of subsidy be α(∈ [0, 1]). (7.b) then becomes
(1 − α)G = f (θ∗ − θ). (18)
The association decides f and G to maximize (7.a) under constraint (18). α is
determined by the government.
8We can show f ∗ < f CS . dCSd f = (θ∗ − θ)2 ∂u
c
∂G N(l∗) > 0 at f = f ∗.
9We can show it. dΠsd f = −(θ∗ − θ) p
s
pc < 0 at f = f ∗ and dΠ
s
d f = −ps dθ
∗
d f N(l∗) > 0 at f = f CS .
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The association’s first order condition is similar to equation (11),
pcn(l∗( f , α))∂l
∗
∂ f = 1. (19)
We can denote the solution of the above equation by f (α), which is a function of
α.















(1 − α)tc′(l∗)c′(θ∗) − pcn(l∗) f ∂uc





dα > 0 since the denominator is positive if we assume the equilibrium is stable as
shown in section 3.2. Thus, the number of open shops in Area C increases when
the government introduces the matching subsidy policy.
The total profit in Area C is
Π( f (α), α) =
∫ θ∗( f (α),α)
θ
(pcN(l∗( f (α), α) − c(θ) − f (α))dθ.
















= (θ∗ − θ)pcn(l∗)∂l
∗
∂α




(1 − α)tc′(l∗)c′(θ∗) − pcn(l∗) f ∂uc




which is positive. The total profit in Area C increases when the government intro-
duces the matching subsidy.
The signs of (d f /dα), (dl∗/dα), and (dG/dα) are ambiguous. If d f /dα > 0,
(dl∗/dα) and (dG/dα) are known to be positive. However, d f /dα < 0 must hold
for some α because limα→0 f = f ∗ > 0 and limα→1 f = 0. When d f /dα < 0
and dG/dα > 0, dl∗/dα > 0 because both the number of open shops, θ∗, and
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the provision of public goods, G, increases. When d f /dα < 0 and dG/dα < 0,
both dl∗/dα > 0 and dl∗/dα < 0 are possible. It may happen that the number of
consumers visiting Area C, l∗, and the public goods supply, G, both decrease when
the government introduces the matching subsidy. In this case, the subsidy benefits
shops both in Area C and in Area S at the expense of consumers and taxpayers.
The sign of dCS/dα is undetermined. dΠs/dα < 0 when d f /dα > 0.
The government chooses α to maximize social welfare taking into account the
association’s response, f (α). The government’s maximization problem is
max
α
S W( f (α), α) = Π( f (α), α) + CS ( f (α), α) + Πs( f (α), α) − αG( f (α), α),
where the last term is the government’s expenditure.




































− αdGdα −G = 0.
What each term indicates is almost the same as the first-order condition of op-
timal fee policy (17). The last two terms are the variation in the government’s
expenditure.
4.3 Transport-Cost Subsidy to Consumers
Let us consider an alternative form of public policy, a transport-cost subsidy. The
government subsidizes a portion of consumers’ transportation costs when they go
shopping in the central shopping area. More consumers will come to Area C if
this policy is in effect, and therefore the profits in Area C will increase, which
in turn enables the association to increase the provision of public goods and the
number of open shops in the area, and attract even more consumers. The policy
can be implemented through reduced public transit fares or the creation of low-
cost public parking.
We assume that the government pays r for each visit to Area C.10 11 Equation
10In our model, r is paid for each unit of goods consumers purchase in Area C.
11A transport cost subsidy proportional to the distance between the consumer and the central
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(5) thus becomes
u(θ∗,G) − pc − tc(l∗) + r = us − ps − ts. (20)
Equations (20), (6), and (7.b) determine θ∗, l∗, and G as functions of f and r.
Given the subsidy rate r, the association chooses f to maximize the total profit.
The first order condition does not change:
pcn(l∗( f , r))∂l
∗
∂ f = 1.
The optimal value of f depends on the level of r; we denote it as f (r).
We can see dθ∗/dr > 0 and dΠ/dr > 0 in the same way as we determined the
effect of the matching subsidy policy. In general, we cannot determine the signs
of (d f /dr), (dl∗/dr), and (dG/dr), but d f /dr > 0, dl∗/dr > 0 and dG/dr > 0 hold
if we specify the functional forms as in Section 5. If a transport-cost subsidy is
introduced, more consumers will visit Area C and the profits in Area C will thlus
increase. More shops can open in Area C and the association will increase the
provision of public goods.
Suppose that the government chooses r to maximize social welfare. The gov-
ernment’s maximization problem is
max
r
S W( f (r), r) =Π( f (r), r) + CS ( f (r), r) + Πs( f (r), r)
− r(θ∗( f (r), r) − θ)N(l∗( f (r), r)).
The last term is the government’s expenditure (the subsidy that consumers re-




































− r(θ∗ − θ)n(l∗)dl
∗
dr = 0.
What each term means is virtually the same as in the case of an optimal-fee policy.
The last term is the increment of public expenditure.12
shopping area is also possible. If the government lowers the fares of public transportation, con-
sumers who live far from the city center will get more benefit from this policy.
12We also considered the transport cost subsidy by the shopping district association. But we
found that such subsidies do not increase the total profits of the central shopping area so the
association does not have an incentive for such a policy in our model.
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5 Evaluation of Alternative Policies
We introduced three types of second-best policies in Section 4. This section eval-
uates these alternative policies through examining their effects on social welfare.
We conducted a numerical simulation for specific functional forms and param-
eter values. Functional forms are specified as follows:
n(l) = 1 for all l ∈ [0, L],
c(θ) = cθ (c > 0),
tc(l) = tcl (tc > 0),
uc(θ∗,G) = aθ∗ + b
√
G + d (a, b, d > 0).
Under these functional forms, equations (5), (6), and (7.b) are rewritten as:
aθ∗ + b
√
G + d − pc − tcl∗ = us − ps − ts, (21)
pcl∗ − cθ∗ − f = 0, (22)
G = f (θ∗ − θ). (23)
Parameters for the numerical simulation are chosen as follows:
L = 3, θ = 0.1, a = 0.5, b = 0.5, c = 4, d = 3, cs = 2,
¯θ = 1, tc = 1.5, ts = 2, us = 3, y = 3, pc = 1, ps = 1.
Table 1 shows the calculation results for six cases: the equilibrium without as-
sociation, the equilibrium with association, the first best allocation, and the three
second-best policies.
Π is the total profit of shops in Area C. CS is the consumer’s surplus. Πs
is the total profit in Area S . S W is social welfare which is Π + CS + Πs −
(public expenditure).
γ in the last row of the table, which is an index of welfare improvement, is
defined as
γ =
(S Win each row) − (S Wat the Equilibrium without Association)
(S Wat the First Best) − (S Wat the Equilibrium without Association) .
First, compare the equilibrium with and without an association. The creation
of the shopping district association increases the number of open shops in the area,
θ∗, and consumers visiting the area, l∗. It also increases total profits in the area,
Π, the consumer surplus, CS , and the social welfare, S W. These results show
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that a shopping district association has a positive effect on the revitalization of the
central shopping area and also improves social welfare.
At the equilibrium, the association faces a trade-off between the provision of
public goods and the number of open shops in the area. To increase the provision
of public goods from the equilibrium level, the association should raise f to fi-
nance larger expenditures. Raising f should, however, induce the closure of more
shops in the area.
Compare the equilibrium to the first-best allocation case. In the first-best al-
location case, both the number of open shops and the provision of public goods
increase from the equilibrium values. There is no trade-off between them in the
optimum because the financial constraint that the revenue from fees should cover
the cost of the provision of public goods does not exist. Two types of subsidies are
required to achieve the first-best allocation. One is the subsidy to each open shop,
which internalizes the externality caused by the number of open shops. The value
of the subsidy is 0.6544 in the numerical analysis. The other is the subsidy to the
association, which removes the distortion caused by the inefficient provision of
public goods. This subsidy is Q = 1.2050 in this numerical example.
Now look at the second-best policies. Compare the optimal fee policy to the
equilibrium. Under this policy, the fee is higher than that at the equilibrium. The
optimal fee f o is larger than the equilibrium fee f ∗ in this example. f ∗ < f o < f CS
(case (ii) in Figure 1) holds true here.13 Consequently the open shops are fewer
under the optimal fee than at the equilibrium. An optimal fee policy improves
social welfare mainly through an increase in the provision of public goods.
The matching subsidy policy increases both the number of open shops, θ∗,
and the total profit in Area C, Π, compared with the equilibrium as shown in
subsection 4.2. This result is in contrast to the optimal fee policy, in which the
number of open shops decreases from the equilibrium value. The membership
fee, f , the provision of public goods, G, and the number of consumers visiting
area C, l∗, are higher than the equilibrium values in this numerical example. The
table shows that the matching subsidy policy attains higher social welfare than the
optimal fee policy. The combination of the association and the government (the
matching subsidy) achieves a better result than either the association alone (the
equilibrium) or the government alone (the optimal fee).
Under the transport-cost subsidy policy, the number of open shops, θ∗, and
the total profit in Area C, Π, increase from the equilibrium. The membership
fee, f , the provision of public goods, G, and the number of consumers visiting
13The fee maximizing the consumer’s surplus, f CS , is 0.0329 in the example.
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Area C, l∗, also increase under the specified functional forms. These facts verify
the analytical result in subsection 4.3. In the numerical analysis, θ∗, l∗, and Π in
this case are much higher than the values at equilibrium and under the other two
second-best policies, while f and G are only slightly greater than the equilibrium
values. The transport-cost subsidy increases the number of consumers visiting
Area C so effectively that the association does not need to increase the provision
of public goods. In this sense, the provision of public goods and a transport-
cost subsidy are substitutable policy instruments for attracting more consumers.
A reduced level of public goods provision translates into fewer membership fees
and more open shops, which further increases the number of consumers visiting
Area C. Social welfare is also the highest among the three second-best policies,
although the government’s expenditure is very large under this policy.
Social welfares attained by the second-best policies are much less than in the
first-best case. One main difference between the two scenarios is that the shops do
not pay any fees and receive a subsidy in the first-best case, while the second-best
policies impose a membership fee on the shops.
6 Conclusion
Voluntary organizations such as BIDs and shopping district associations are be-
lieved to provide a solution to the decline of traditional central shopping areas.
We have shown the effects and limitations of shopping district associations.
Shopping district associations provide various public goods that no individual
shop on its own could provide. The number of shutdown shops in the area is de-
creased by the formation of an association. We show that the association improves
the profitability of shops in the area and the welfare of consumers. Shopping
district associations therefore play a definite role in revitalizing central shopping
areas and keeping city centers from deteriorating.
On the other hand, however, there are limitations to what the associations can
do. Equilibrium with an association is inefficient because the association is not
concerned with the positive externalities received by consumers. The government
can internalize the externalities and improve social welfare using second-best poli-
cies. We examined optimal membership fee policy, matching subsidy policy, and
the transport-cost subsidy policy, and evaluated them using numerical analysis.
One possible extension is to introduce land market, which will enable us to
deal with the effect of other policies such as tax increment financing. Another
outstanding problem is that we did not analyze the process of association forma-
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tion. Our model assumes that all shops join the association; i.e. participation in
the association is compulsory. If participation is actually voluntary, however, indi-
vidual shops may not have enough of an incentive to join the association. They are
better off not paying the membership fees and simply enjoying the public goods
provided by the association. However, if all shops in the area did this, the associ-
ation would not be able to sustain itself. What kind of incentive might entice the
shops to pay the association’s membership fee and to contribute to the provision
of public goods? And how are voluntary associations sustainable? Answering


































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Three cases of welfare maximizing value po
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